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INTRODUCTION
Thoughtcrime was not a thing that could be concealed forever'
Torture is obsolete, or at least obsolescent. Researchers, funded
by the Department of Defense, 2 have developed technologies that may
render the "dark art"i ' of interrogation unnecessary. 4 As these tech-
nologies are implemented, many of the legal issues surrounding the
aggressive "counter-resistance techniques"5 the United States pres-
ently employs against individuals detained in the Global War on Ter-
rorism (GWOT) may be rendered moot. At the same time, however,
these technologies themselves raise new legal issues.
The most promising of these new technologies is psychiatric
neuroimaging, the predominant form of which is functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI). 6 FMRI provides near-real time, ultra-
high resolution, computer-generated models of brain activity. 7 These
models allow the operator to observe a subject's neural response to
cognitive or sensory-motor tasks. In essence, fMRI allows the operator
to watch the subject's brain think. This has a number of practical ap-
plications. For instance, fMRI could function as a hyper-accurate lie
detector. In addition, an interrogator could also assess a detainee's
response to specific stimuli. For example, an interrogator could pre-
sent a detainee with pictures of suspected terrorists, or of potential
terrorist targets, which would generate certain neural responses if the
detainee were familiar with the subjects pictured. U.S. intelligence
agencies have been interested in deploying fMRI technology in inter-
rogation for years.8 It now appears that they can.
This Note seeks to analyze the legality of the use of fMRI during
the interrogation of foreign detainees9 in U.S. custody in light of ap-
plicable international and domestic law. The fundamental goal of the
1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 19 (Signet Classic 1977) (1949).
2 See Harvey Rishikof & Michael Schrage, Technology vs. Torture, SLATE, Aug. 18, 2004,
at http://slate.msn.com/id/2105332/ (last visited May 24, 2005).
3 See, e.g., Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003,
at 51 (discussing the history and modern practice of interrogation).
4 See Rishikof & Schrage, supra note 2.
5 See Memorandum from Donald A. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Commander,
U.S. Southern Command (Apr. 16, 2003), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD To ABu
GHRAIB 360 (KarenJ. Greenberg &Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE
PAPERS].
6 See Rishikof &. Schrage, supra note 2.
7 See discussion infra Part I.B.
8 See Ian Sample & David Adam, The Brain Can't Lie, GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2003, Life, at
4, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/life/feature/story/0,13026,1088572,00.html
(last visited May 24, 2005).
9 This Note uses the term "detainee," consistent with U.S. military practice, to refer
to any person captured or otherwise detained during war or operations other than war.
The term detainee "is the broadest term [that can be used to refer to captured individuals,
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law of interrogation is to protect, to varying degrees, a detainee's free
will by restricting an interrogator's ability to employ techniques that
overcome this will. 10 In the main, the law assumes that the interroga-
tor will attempt to overcome the detainee's will with pain. Outside of
the Prisoner of War (POW) context the law will countenance the in-
fliction of some-often surprisingly high-level of pain." Thus, the
primary goal of the law in this area is to delineate how much pain an
interrogator may legally inflict. FMRI, however, presents a categori-
cally different problem. FMRI allows an interrogator to eliminate a
detainee's free will painlessly. Consequently, fMRI presents a much
more difficult set of legal issues than current counter-resistance
techniques.
A foreign detainee in U.S. custody is entitled to varying levels of
protection during interrogation depending on the detainee's legal
status and physical location. 12 Based on these factors, detainees may
be grouped into three categories: POWs and civilians detained during
an international armed conflict, unlawful combatants held within U.S.
territory, and unlawful combatants held outside of U.S. territory.'
3
The first group, POWs and civilians, qualifies for protection under
International Humanitarian Law (IHL),14 which provides the most ex-
pansive level of protection. IHL prohibits the use of "coercion" in
interrogation.1 5
The use of fMRI to detect deception in the voluntary statements
of these detainees is probably permissible, while the use of fMRI to
extract involuntary cognitive information from these detainees is
probably not. IHL bans the use of "coercion" in interrogation.
Under the U.S. military's current interpretation of this provision, "co-
and it is] without legal status connotations." See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S.
ARMY, LAW OF WAR WORK SHOP DESWBOOK 73 (CDR Brian J. Bill, JAGC, USN ed., 2000).
10 See infra Parts II, III.
I' See id.
12 See infia Part III.A.
13 See id.
14 International humanitarian law is the contemporary term for the "law of war" or
"law of armed conflict." It encompasses the major conventions governing the conduct of
war (jus in bello), such as the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I], the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II], the Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva III], the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
IV], and the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. See Derek Jinks & David
Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions, 90 CORNELL L. RsV. 97, 108-11 (2004)
(discussing the role of the Geneva Conventions in international humanitarian law).
15 See infra Part II.B.
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ercion revolve [s] around eliminating the source's free will." 1 6 The in-
voluntary use of fMRI to extract cognitive information would
compromise the detainee's free will and, therefore, violate IHL.
The second category of detainees consists of individuals to whom
IHL does not apply, such as so-called "unlawful combatants," whom
the U.S. is holding within U.S. territory. These detainees are entitled
to protection under International Human Rights Law (IHRL).1 7
These conventions protect detainees against torture and cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading (CID) treatment.1 8 The use of fMRI in the interro-
gation of these detainees would almost certainly not represent
torture.' 9 Torture requires the infliction of pain; fMRI is painless.
CID treatment presents a much closer question. 20 The United
States defines CID treatment as coterminous with conduct that would
violate the Fifth,2' Eighth, 22 or Fourteenth Amendments 23 to the U.S.
Constitution, rendering the constitutional analysis associated with
these amendments identical to the analysis used to identify CID treat-
ment.2 4 A U.S. court would probably analyze this issue under the Due
Process Clause, which prohibits custodial conduct that "shocks the
conscience." 25 The inquiry into whether government conduct "shocks
the conscience" requires a three part analysis: first, an analysis of the
conduct surrounding the government's personal invasion; second, an
analysis of the inherent invasiveness of the personal invasion; and
third, the government interest, if any, that justifies the invasion. The
use of fMRI to detect deception in a detainee's voluntary statements
to interrogators would almost certainly not shock the conscience,
given the minimal invasiveness of the procedure.
There probably are instances, however, where the involuntary use
of fMRI to extract cognitive information from a nonconsenting de-
tainee would shock the conscience. Although fMRI is less physically
16 See id.
17 International human rights law protects an individual's rights against state interfer-
ence. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATry Doc. No. 100-20, 23
I.L.M. 1027 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Part II.B.1.
20 See infra Part III.B.2.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24 See 136 CONG. REC. 36198 (1990) (documenting the Senate ratification of the CAT
with the reservation that CID treatment under the Convention means "the cruel, unusual
and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States").
25 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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invasive than most practices U.S. courts have held to shock the con-
science, fMRI is mentally invasive.2 6 Indeed, fMRI is one of the few
technologies to which the now clich~d moniker of "Orwellian" legiti-
mately applies. Thus, the use of fMRI technology to extract informa-
tion from a nonconsenting detainee would probably shock the
conscience, assuming the government could not provide a legitimate
justification for the scan. There clearly are scenarios, however, such
as high-value detainees with extensive knowledge of terrorist networks
or detainees with knowledge of imminent terrorist attacks, where the
government could justify the involuntary application of the scan.
The third category of detainees consists of individuals to whom
IHL does not apply and whom the U.S. is holding outside U.S. terri-
tory.2 7 The U.S. government contends that the various human rights
treaties to which the United States is party do not bind U.S. officials
operating outside U.S. territory.2 8 Although this interpretation is of
debatable validity, it does represent the historical practice of the
United States, and the United States is unlikely to revise this policy in
the near future. Thus, under current policy, these detainees are enti-
fled to protection only under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (Federal Tor-
ture Statute). 29 The Federal Torture Statute prohibits torture, but not
CID treatment.30 Therefore, detainees being held outside U.S. terri-
tory are, under current policy, protected only against torture. Conse-
quently, the use of fMRI technology in the interrogation of these
detainees would be legal, at least insofar as the U.S. interpretation of
applicable law is legally correct.
This Note examines the legality of the use of fMRI technology in
the interrogation of foreign detainees. Part I provides background on
current U.S. interrogation doctrine and the role of fMRI in interroga-
tion. Part II examines fMRI in light of IHL, arguing that while its use
to detect deception in the voluntary statements of detainees is permis-
sible, its involuntary use in interrogation would violate the anticoer-
cion provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Part III examines fMRI in
light of IHRL and the U.S. Constitution, arguing that although fMRI
would not constitute torture its use in many cases would probably
shock the conscience and, therefore, would be illegal under IHRL
and the Constitution. The Note concludes by arguing that although
fMRI does not represent a complete technological solution to the le-
gal problem of torture, it nevertheless is permissible in certain limited
instances.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 58-79.
27 See infra Part III.A.1.
28 See id.
29 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
30 See id § 2340.
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I
INTERROGATION AND FMRI
A. U.S. Interrogation Doctrine and Techniques
U.S. military interrogators, referred to as "echoes," are trained at
the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ari-
zona.31 At Huachuca, instructors teach sixteen distinct methods, or
approaches, of interrogation.3 2 These sixteen methods are based on
psychological ploys. Their names reflect the bases of each ploy, such
as "Love of Comrades" and "Hate of Comrades" or "Fear Down" and
"Fear Up." 5 The first course that military interrogators take at
Huachuca, however, is in the Geneva and Hague Conventions. 34 The
training emphasizes that soldiers must obey the Conventions without
exception. One graduate of the interrogation school at Huachuca
commented that the instructors so emphasized that anyone caught vi-
olating the Conventions would be sent to the U.S. military prison at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas that "by the end of our time at Huachuca
the three syllables 'Lea-ven-worth' were ringing in our ears."3 5
Nevertheless, the United States is almost certainly engaging in
conduct that violates legal restraints on the interrogation of foreign
detainees. Even leaving aside such obvious excesses as Abu Ghraib,
the United States has, if press 36 and government 37 reports are to be
believed, employed extreme coercive methods in interrogation. It is
also of some note that since the GWOT began, the U.S. military has
launched over 370 criminal investigations into charges of misconduct
involving detainees, with 130 of those investigations resulting in some
31 CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: INSIDE THE SECRET WAR
AGAINST AL QAEDA 29 (2004).
32 See id. at 39.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 30-33.
35 Id. at 31.
36 See Carol D. Leonnig & Dana Priest, Detainees Accuse Female Interrogators: Pentagon
Inquiry Is Said to Confirm Muslims'Accounts of Sexual Tactics at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Feb.
10, 2005, at A01; Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for FBI, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A06; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facili-
ties, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A01. For a more extensive analysis of U.S. detention and
interrogation operations, see DAVID ROSE, GuANTANAmo: THE WAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(2004).
37 1NDEP. PANEL TO RFVIEW DOD DET. OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT 33-38 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d2004O824finalreport.pdf (last visited
May 24, 2005); Dan Eggen & R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guanta-
namo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A01 (discussing memos from FBI agents and offi-
cials detailing U.S. ill-treatment of detainees); Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect
Alleges Torture: Detainee Says US. Sent Him to Egypt Before Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
2005, at A01 (same).
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form of punishment.38 Indeed, at least twenty-six detainees in U.S.
custody appear to have been victims of homicide committed by U.S.
personnel.39 Although U.S. interrogation practices may have become
more pacific in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib and the declassification
of the so-called "Torture Memos,"40 there are indications that the
United States still uses aggressive interrogation techniques. 41 Other
means of interrogation, however, may soon be available.
B. FMRI Technology
FMRI is a form of psychiatric neuroimaging. It is a hybrid tech-
nique that generates a series of ultra-high resolution structural scans
of the brain, which reveal brain activity. 42 The fMRI machine itself is
essentially a giant magnet, thousands of times stronger than Earth's
magnetic field.43 The subject of an fMRI scan lies down on a table,
which is then slid into a hollow, circular casing that houses the mag-
net.44 Although the subject must remain still during the actual scan-
ning,45 the procedure is neither painful nor physically invasive. 46
Moreover, fMRI has no known or foreseeable direct health risks asso-
38 See Robert Burns, Rumsfeld Defends Handling of Detainees: Acknowledges Some Have Been
Mistreated, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 2005, at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washing
ton/articles/2005/06/02/rumsfeld defendshandlingof detainees/ (last visitedJune 26,
2005).
39 See Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, US. Military Says 26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at Al.
40 See Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics Is Disavowed: Justice
Document Had Said Torture May Be Defensible, WASH. POST, June 23, 2004, at A01 (discussing
the declassification of the Bush Administration memoranda regarding torture and interna-
tional law); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERA-
TIONAL CONCERNS (2003) [hereinafter DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT], in THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 5, at 286; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURtE PAPERS,
supra note 5, at 172; Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, &
RobertJ. Delabunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep't of
Defense (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5, at 38.
41 See Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates'Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2005, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (discussing the International Committee of the Red Cross's claims that
the United States was employing levels of "psychological and sometimes physical coercion
'tantamount to torture'" in the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).
42 Michael S. Beauchamp, Functional MdRJfor Beginners, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 397
(2002) (reviewing RICHARD B. BUXTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (2002) and FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS (PeterJezzard et al. eds., 2001)).
43 See id.
44 See Dennis O'Brien, Mind Readers: Scanning Technology Promises to Map the Brain's
Pathways, but Some Fear Its Ability to Expose a Patient's Secrets and Lies, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 10,
2004, at IE.
45 See Sample & Adam, supra note 8.
46 See Beauchamp, supra note 42, at 398.
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ciated with its use.47 The extreme power of the magnet, however,
presents the one indirect risk associated with the technology-the
magnet can pull metal objects, such as a metal watch on the subject's
wrist or a piece of shrapnel in the subject's body, into the machine
with extreme force. 48 The equipment is also expensive. An fMRI
scanner costs around three million dollars and requires experts to
operate .4
FMRI involves the time-lapsed superimposition of a series of
structural scans of the brain.5 0 FMRI relies on blood oxygenation
level dependent (BOLD) contrast to detect increases in neuronal ac-
tivity.51 The BOLD contrast method is based on the fact that the
amount of oxygen carried by hemoglobin causes alterations in its
magnetic field. 52 The magnet in the fMRI scanner detects changes in
the magnetic field.5 3 These changes in regional blood oxygenation
levels indicate localized changes in metabolic activity and, therefore,
brain activity.54 Representations of these changes are sequentially
projected onto a three-dimensional, computer-generated image of the
subject's brain. 55 Because the fMRI scanner measures circulatory ad-
justment owing to increased brain activity rather than brain activity
itself, the scanner does not provide real-time data, although the re-
sponse to the stimuli can be assessed within approximately two
seconds. 56 Moreover, fMRI provides a much more detailed rendering
than any comparable imaging method. For example, fMRI provides
resolution that is an order of magnitude better than the previous
state-of-the-art technology, the Positron Emission Tomography (PET)
scan.
57
C. Application in Interrogation
The fMRI scanner can function as a lie detector. Researchers at
the University of Texas Health Science Center's Research Imaging
Center conducted one of the first publicly available studies using fMRI
47 See id. at 397.
48 See id.
49 See O'Brien, supra note 44.
50 See J.W. Belliveau et. al., Functional Mapping of the Human Visual Cortex by Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 254 SCIENCE 716, 717 fig. 2 (1991).
51 See Peter A. Bandettini & Leslie G. Ungerleider, From Neuron to BOLD: New Connec-
tions, 4 NATURE: NEUROSCIENCE 864, 864 (2001).
52 Id
53 See Belliveau et al., supra note 50, at 717.
54 See Bandettini & Ungerleider, supra note 51, at 864.
55 See Belliveau et al., supra note 50, at 717.
56 See Luis Hernandez et al, Temporal Sensitivity of Event-Related fMRI, 17 NEURoIMAGE
1018, 1023-25 (2002).
57 See Beauchamp, supra note 42, at 398.
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to detect lying.58 The study involved two tests. In the first, the sub-
jects were shown a three-digit number and then shown a second num-
ber.59 The researchers then asked the subjects if the numbers
matched. 60 In the second set of tests, the researchers asked subjects
autobiographical questions, such as where they were born.6 1 In both
tests, the researchers requested that the subjects give false answers as
convincingly as possible.6z
The researchers observed activity in four regions of the brain
when the subjects lied.6 3 The fMRI scanner showed activity in the sub-
ject's left and right cerebral hemispheres, specifically in the prefrontal
and frontal, parietal, temporal, and sub-cortical regions. 64 The re-
searchers concluded that this activation in the parietal region, which
houses the brain's calculation center, was the result of the subject's
formulation of the lie, as opposed to the recall of an existing mem-
ory.65 Thus, unlike a traditional polygraph-which measures a sub-
ject's emotional response to lying 66 -fMRI detects a subject's decision
to lie.6 7 Moreover, unlike a traditional polygraph-in which individu-
als could be trained to suppress the emotional response to, and hence
physiological manifestation of, lying 6 8-subjects cannot control their
cerebral activity to avoid detection.69
The fMRI scanner, however, is much more than an advanced lie
detector. The University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Strategic Anal-
ysis and Response (ISTAR) has developed methods that apply fMRI
technology to counterterrorism operations. 70 Ruben Gur, a neurop-
sychologist at ISTAR, notes that fMRI technology can already be used
58 Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM.
BRAIN MAPPING 157, 158 (2002); see also Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During
Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROImAGE
727 (2002) (assessing the utility of fMRI as a lie detector).
59 See Lee et al., suzpra note 58, at 159.
60 Id
61 Id.
62 Id,
63 Id. at 161.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 162.
66 Compare Susan Gaidos, Written All Over Your Face: Even the Coolest Criminal Can t Hide
a Guilty Countenance, NEw ScIENrisT, Mar. 12, 2005, at 39 ("Just taking [a polygraph] can
upset truthful people to the point where they appear dishonest, while practised liars can
learn to outwit the machine by remaining calm."), with G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of
Different Types of Deception: AnJMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 830 (2003) (not-
ing that using fMRI scientists may "examine directly the organ that produces lies, the
brain").
67 See Lee et al., supra note 58, at 163.
68 See Gaidos, supra note 66.
69 See Lee et al., supra note 58, at 163.
70 Faye Flam, Your Brain May Soon Be Used Against You, PHILtA. INQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2002,
at A01.
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to determine if a subject recognizes a picture of another human
face. 7 1 As with lying, certain regions of the brain "light up" on an
fMRI scan when a subject sees a familiar human face. 72 Seeing a fa-
miliar face stimulates brain activity in the hippocampus, which regu-
lates memory and parts of the visual cortex. 73 Thus, fMRI reveals
recognition regardless of whether the individual speaks or attempts to
conceal the recognition. 74
Moreover, although this technique is not yet fully developed, it
may soon be possible to determine how the subject became familiar
with the person or item pictured, such as whether the subject had
first-hand knowledge of the stimulus or whether the subject had
merely become familiar with the stimulus from a picture. 75 Similarly,
it may be possible to use fMRI to determine individuals' feelings about
others, rather than just whether they recognize them. 76 For example,
researchers at the University of London believe they have located the
specific brain regions associated with love. 77
These advances probably represent only a small fraction of the
ultimate capabilities of advanced brainscanning. Some scientists
claim that within fifty years they "will have a way to essentially read
minds."7 To some extent, this has already been accomplished. In a
recent study, scientists using a new, higher-resolution form of fMRI
were able to determine what subjects were looking at, even when the
subjects themselves were not consciously aware of what they were
seeing.79
Although fMRI may not provide the ability to read a detainee's
entire mind, the ability to assess whether a detainee has personal
knowledge of people or places would nonetheless be useful in interro-
gation. It is important to understand, moreover, that intelligence in-
terrogation is not about uncovering all that there is to know from
"one key evil genius."80 Rather, interrogation is about uncovering
"tiny bits of the truth" from a large number of detainees.8 1 Thus,
while the ability of fMRI to detect whether an individual had person-
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See Scott M. Hayes et al., AnfMRI Study of Episodic Memory: Retieval of Object, Spatial,
and TemporalInformation, 118 BEHAvORAL NEUROSCIENCE 885, 885-96 (2004) (discussing a
study involving episodic, or first-hand, memory).
76 See Sample & Adam, supra note 8.
77 See id.
78 Flam, supra note 70.
79 See Yukiyasu Kamitani & Frank Tong, Decoding the Visual and Subjective Contents of the
Human Brain, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 679, 679 (2005).
80 See MACKEV & MILLER, supra note 31, at xxv.
81 Id.
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ally seen Osama Bin Laden or a particular building in a city would be
of obvious value, so too would its potential ability to assess an individ-
ual's personal knowledge of, for example, other mid- to low-level
known terrorists or terrorist training camps. Similarly, fMRI could be
used during intake screening, allowing interrogation efforts to be fo-
cused on prisoners who show recognition of key people or places and
facilitating the release of those who do not.
II
FMRI UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANiTARIAN LAW
A. Applicable Law
1. Detainee Status
Detainees are entitled to different levels of legal protection
against interrogation depending on their legal status.8 2 Detainees
protected by the Geneva Conventions receive the highest level of pro-
tection. The Conventions apply in instances of international armed
conflict involving a High Contracting Party.8 3 A de facto state of
armed conflict is all that is necessary to implicate the Conventions. 4
The parties do not have to have declared war officially., -5
The Conventions protect two types of detainees: POWs and civil-
ians. The Third Geneva Convention (Geneva III) addresses the treat-
ment of POWs.8 6 Not all persons captured during an aimed conflict,
however, are entitled to POW status. Article 4 of Geneva III sets forth
the categories of individuals to be accorded POW status upon cap-
ture.8 7 Article 4 specifies that, among other individuals, members of
opposing armed forces are entitled to POW status.88 Similarly, Ge-
neva III entitles members of militias and organized resistance move-
ments to POW status upon capture, provided they meet certain other
criteria such as carrying their arms openly and obeying the laws of
war.89 In essence, the Conventions seek to accord POW status to indi-
82 See generally Geneva 1-IY, supra note 14 (protecting different groups of persons and
providing varying rights to each group).
83 See id. art. 2; see, e.g., FRITs KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 10-11 (1973) (defin-
ing "armed conflict" as a "conflict involving hostilities of a certain intensity between armed
forces of opposing Parties").
84 Geneva I-IV, supra note 14, art. 2.
85 Id.
86 See Geneva I1, supra note 14, art. 4.
87 See id. For a detailed analysis of the requirements an individual must meet to gain
POW status, see ALLAN RosAs, THE LEGAL STATuS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 326-75 (1976); W.
Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants under the
International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'l L. 39, 49-65
(1977).
88 Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 4.
89 To qualify as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions, combatants must do
the following: (1) serve under a commander who is responsible for his subordinates, (2)
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viduals who are recognized as lawful combatants under the Conven-
tions. In addition, the Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva IV)
specifically requires contracting parties to treat civilians humanely. 90
The GWOT, however, has occasioned the use of a third classification:
"unlawful combatant."9 1 An unlawful combatant is neither a POW
nor a civilian but rather subject to an intermediate classification. 92
Thus, an unlawful combatant is a person who has directly participated
in hostilities but who does not satisfy the requirements for POW sta-
tus.93 Under current U.S. policy, unlawful combatants do not receive
protection under the Geneva Conventions.94 In addition, the United
States has denied Geneva protections to other terrorist detainees
under the theory that the GWOT itself does not qualify as an interna-
tional armed conflict and, therefore, does not implicate the Geneva
regime.95 The current U.S. policies are of debatable legal merit,9 6 al-
though that debate is beyond the scope of this Note. The legal status
of these detainees, to whom IHL does not apply, is addressed in Part
III.
2. Protections under Geneva III
POW detainees are entitled to protection under Geneva III. 9 7 Ar-
ticle 17 of Geneva III sets forth the general rule for the interrogation
wear a fixed distinctive sign, (3) carry arms openly, and (4) adhere to the laws of war. See
id. art. 4(A)(2).
90 See Geneva V, supra note 14, arts. 3-4.
91 See Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, How Do U.S. Interrogato7s Make a Captured Terrorist
Talk?, WALL ST.J., Mar. 4, 2003, at B1; WHITE HOUSE FAcr SHEEr, STATUS OF DETAINEES AT
GUANTANAMO, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020207-13.
html (Feb. 7, 2002) (expressing the U.S. policy that Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees are
not entitled to POW status, but fit into a different category altogether). U.S. policy dictates
that the United States will treat detainees "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949." See WHITE HousE FACr SHEET, supra; see also Katherine Q.
Seelye, In Shfif, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al
(describing the Bush administration's policy change and decision to apply the Geneva
Convention to the Taliban but not Al Qaeda).
92 See Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 Am. J. INT'L L.
328, 335 (2002) (discussing the status of Al Qaeda and Taliban members as unlawful com-
batants, rather than lawful combatants or civilians);John C. Yoo &James C. Ho, The Status
of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 216-17 (2003) (noting the distinctions between civilians
and armed forces and between lawful and unlawful combatants).
93 See Yoo & Ho, supra note 92, at 215-17.
94 See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Who Is a Prisoner of War? You Could Look It
Up. Maybe, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2002, § 4, at 9.
95 Id (quoting a senior administration official as saying, "This is a new kind of war, in
which the rules we followed for more than 50 years don't necessarily apply").
96 See, e.g., DerekJinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 aiRv. IrNT'L L.J. 367,
372-74 (2004); Linda Macdonald Glenn, Keeping an Open Mind: What Legal Safeguards are
Needed?, 5 Am. J. OF BIOETHICS 60 (2005).
97 See Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 4.
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of POWs. 98 It provides that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure
from them information of any kind whatever." 99 In addition, POWs
"who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."10 0 Notably, al-
though Geneva III places restrictions on the methods that can be used
to extract information from an interrogation subject, nothing in the
Conventions prohibits interrogation itself.101 The Conventions regu-
late only the method of interrogation. 10 2
Article 17 expanded upon the protections that the 1929 Geneva
Convention afforded POWs. The impetus for this expansion was the
widespread violation of the 1929 Convention a0 3 during World War
11.104 The analogous provision of the 1929 Geneva Convention pro-
vided that "[n]o coercion may be used on prisoners to secure infor-
mation relative to the condition of their army or country."'10 5 Thus,
Geneva III both expanded the types of information protected by the
1929 Convention ("information of any kind whatever") and reduced
the means by which information could be extracted (" [n] o physical or
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion").10 6 In keeping with
Geneva III's expansive protections, both "torture" and "coercion"
should be interpreted broadly.
Several other provisions in Geneva III affect interrogation meth-
ods. Article 13 states that no POW "may be subjected to ... medical
or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the
medical, dental, or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and
carried out in his interest."10 7  Article 13 also provides that
"[p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely treated,"'10 and
"must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or
98 See id. art. 17.
99 Id. art. 17, para. 4.
100 Id.
101 JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY ON III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREAT-
MENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 163-64 (jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Henry trans., Int'l Comm. of
the Red Cross 1960).
102 See id.; Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The
Third Geneva Convention and the "War on Terror," 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 301, 307 (2003)
("[A] rticle 17 does not prohibit interrogation .... By limiting the tactics available to elicit
responses, the Geneva Convention implicitly acknowledges that interrogations of a pris-
oner are expected and inevitable.").
103 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Jul. 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 2 Bevans 932 [hereinafter 1929 Convention].
104 See DE PREUX, supra note 101, at 163.
105 1929 Convention, supra note 103, art. 5.
106 See Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 17, para. 4; McDonald & Sullivan, supra note 102,
at 309 (discussing the Geneva Convention's attempts to broaden the protections afforded
by the 1929 Convention).
107 Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 13, para. 1.
108 Id.
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intimidation."1 °0 According to the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Conventions, Article 13 both
prohibits the Detaining Power from using corporal punishment and
requires the Detaining Power to protect the detainee from harm. 110
Similarly, Article 14 of Geneva III states that POWs are "entitled in all
circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour."
1 1
'
3. Protections under the Hague Convention and Geneva IV
Civilians are protected under both the Hague Convention,"
2
which is designed to govern occupations, and Geneva IV.1 3 Under
Article 44 of the Hague Convention, the occupying power may not
"force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish informa-
tion about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of
defence."' ' 4
Article 31 of Geneva IV similarly provides that "[n] o physical or
moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons [i.e., civil-
ians], in particular to obtain information from them or from third
parties."' 15 Article 27 entitles civilians, "in all circumstances, to re-
spect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their relig-
ious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs."" 6
According to the ICRC Commentary, the "right of respect for the per-
son.. . covers all the rights of the individual... which are inseparable
from the human being by the very fact of his existence and his mental
and physical powers; it includes . . . the right to physical, moral and
intellectual integrity-an essential attribute of the human person."
1 7
The "right to physical integrity" prohibits acts that could impair the
individual's life or health.' 1" The right to "intellectual integrity" re-
quires the detaining power to exhibit "respect for all the moral values
which form part of man's heritage, and applies to the whole complex
structure of convictions, conceptions and aspirations peculiar to each
individual." 19
109 Id.
110 DE P utix, supra note 101, at 141.
111 Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 14, para. 1.
112 Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 44.
113 Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 3.
114 Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 44.
115 Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 31.
116 Id. art 27.
117 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY ON IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECT1ON OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 201 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin &
C.W. Dumbleton trans., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1958).
118 Id.
I19 Id.
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B. Permissibility under International Humanitarian Law
The Geneva Conventions prohibit the use of coercion, but do not
define the term. Geneva III, applicable to POWs, prohibits the use of
"any ... form of coercion." 12 0 Geneva IV, however, prohibits only the
use of "physical or moral coercion" against civilians.12 1 The difference
between Geneva III's and Geneva IV's standards is not clear, as it is
unclear what techniques the phrase "physical or moral coercion" en-
compasses. The language seems to suggest that the prohibition
against the use of coercion is stricter vis-d-vis POWs than civilians. But
that result-that civilians would receive less protection than combat-
ants-seems anomalous in the IHL context.122 Thus, the two stan-
dards must be interpreted to have substantially similar definitions.
The U.S. military's Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation
(FM 34-52)123 sets forth the U.S. military's basic doctrine regarding
coercion in interrogation.1 24 FM 34-52 defines coercion as "actions
designed to unlawfully induce another to compel an act against one's
will."125 In interrogation, the "act" that occurs against the detainee's
will is the detainee's revelation of information to the interrogator. FM
34-52 goes on to state that "coercion revolve [s] around eliminating
the source's free will." 126 This suggests a very broad reading of the
coercion element. Moreover, American constitutional law, although
it is not a binding interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, is also
instructive. In U.S. domestic law, a defendant's confession is inadmis-
sible if the defendant has been coerced. 127 A defendant is coerced if
the individual's "will was overborne" 28 or if the defendant's confes-
sion was not "the product of a rational intellect and a free will."'12 9
Is fMRI coercive? In this regard, it is important to distinguish
between the scanner's use as a next-generation lie detector and its use
to extract cognitive information more generally from the detainee.
Traditional lie detectors are not coercive. Polygraphs work by de-
tecting physical changes in a subject's body when that subject answers
interrogation questions.13 0 As such, they are mere passive observers.
120 Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 17, para. 4.
121 Geneva IV, supra note 14, art. 31.
122 SeeJinks, supra note 96, at 378 (noting that civilians generally receive protections
"identical" to those provided to POWs).
123 DEP'T OF THE ARM21Y, FIELD MANUAL 34-52: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION (1992)
[hereinafter FM 34-52].
124 See id. at 1-8; DOD WORKING GpouP REPORT, supra note 40, at 332 (discussing the
role and status of FM 34-52).
125 FM 34-52, supra note 123, at 1-8.
126 Id.
127 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
128 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961).
129 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).
1-0 See Langleben et al., supra note 58, at 727.
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Moreover, there is also an element of consent in a traditional poly-
graph examination, as the detainee must voluntarily answer the inter-
rogator's questions for the polygraph examination to work.13 1
Furthermore, in theory, nothing prevents an interrogator-with-
out the assistance of a polygraph-from assessing some of the same
physiological responses in a detainee, such as increased respiration,
heart rate, or galvanic skin response. Such an interrogator would not
be able to make these assessments with the same degree of accuracy as
a polygraph, but this is a difference of degree, rather than kind. And
there would, of course, be nothing objectionable about an interroga-
tor with such highly attuned observational powers. Thus, an fMRI
scanner, when being used to detect deception when the detainee is
voluntarily answering questions, is analogous to a traditional poly-
graph and probably not coercive.
When the fMRI is used to extract cognitive information from a
detainee, such as whether the detainee knew particular people or
places, however, the legal question is much closer. Arguably, the poly-
graph analogy also applies to fMRI in this context, as the scanner is
being used as a passive collector of information-here, brain activity
rather than respiration or galvanic response. In this case, however,
the analogy to the polygraph is erroneous.
Here the analogy relies upon the mistaken assumption of mind-
body dualism. 132 While commonly held, the concept of mind-body
dualism-that there exists a separate "mind" that controls the brain-
has been conclusively rejected by the vast majority of neuroscien-
tists. 1 3 3 The assumption of mind-body dualism fundamentally misun-
derstands the structure and function of the brain. There is, for
example, neither a central memory storage depot in the brain, which
"the mind" then accesses,1 3 4 nor some internal theatre in the brain
131 See Erika Jonietz, Picking Your Brain, TECH. REV., Nov. 2004, at 74, 75.
132 See RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY WITH SELECIIONS FROM OB-
JECI"IONS AND REPLIES 16-23 (John Cottingham ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed.
1996); see also Matthew D. Bunker & David K Perry, Standing at the Crossroads: Social Science,
Human Agency and Free Speech Law, 9 ComM. L. & POl'Y 1, 15 (2004) ("Mind-body dualism
exemplifies a more general tendency for some philosophers to posit separate domains for
the spiritual and the material.").
133 See Michael Morgan, What's Mind? No Matter!, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1049, 1049
(1999) (reviewing IAN GLYNN, AN ANATOMY OF THOUGHT: THE ORIGIN AND MACHINERY OF
THE MIND (1999)). Morgan remarks, "Clearly we are all identity theorists now; dualists in
neuroscience are about as common as Lamarkians in biology." Id. Lamarck was a pre-
Darwinian evolutionary theorist; Lamarkians are, therefore, uncommon. SeeJEAN-BAPTISTE
LAMARCK, ZOOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN ExPOsITION WITH REGARD TO THE NATURAL HISTORY
OF ANimiLs (Hugh Elliot trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1984) (1809).
134 See Gerald D. Fischbach, Mind and Brain, Sci. Am., Sept. 1992, at 48, 48 (describing
the mind as "a collection of mental processes").
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that plays sensory inputs for the mind's viewing.' 35 Thus, although
the scanner is monitoring brain activity, it is not monitoring some sec-
ondary or tertiary indicator of thought processes or memories being
computed or residing elsewhere "in the mind." FMRI is, in actuality,
"reading a person's mind," to the extent that that phrase is intelligi-
ble. Consequently, in this context, fMRI is not passively monitoring
the brain for information but rather affirmatively extracting informa-
tion from it.
Furthermore, the analogy ignores the inherently involuntary na-
ture of fMRI in this context. Even if a detainee took a conscious, af-
firmative decision that he would not provide an interrogator with any
information regarding the identities of people or places, fMRI would
compromise this decision and extract the information from the de-
tainees mind. In this way, fMRI is much more coercive than most
methods of aggressive interrogation, such as the application of physi-
cal pressure. Physical pressure is coercive because it puts the subject
to a choice between enduring more physical pressure or providing
information. Under such circumstances, a subject's decision to pro-
vide information is said to be "coerced" because external forces have
compromised the subject's ability to take a rational decision to reveal
or not reveal information.
Admittedly, fMRI does not present the subject with such a choice.
But this makes fMRI more, rather than less, coercive. The proper fo-
cus of any analysis of coercion is not the detainee's "choice," but
rather the destruction of the detainee's free will to choose. It is prob-
lematic to discuss "choice" in a coercive interrogation environment
because the use of the term rests on a dubious inversion of "the ideas
of agency, consent, and responsibility that help shape our ideas of self
and of self-government. '" 136 Thus, the point is not that the detainee
"chooses" to endure more coercion or to give up information, but
rather that the coercive interrogation method has robbed the de-
tainee of his free will to choose. As does fMRI.
Consequently, fMRI simply represents a more extreme form of
coercion than techniques such as physical pressure. Because individu-
als cannot control their cognitive activity, the fMRI scanner com-
pletely eliminates the detainee's free will.137 For example, fMRI can
reveal whether the subject recognizes a certain face by analyzing the
subject's brain activity after an interrogator shows the subject a picture
135 See Francis Crick & Christof Koch, The Problem of Consciousness, Sci. AM., Sept. 1992,
at 153, 153-59.
136 SeeJohn T. Parry, What is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are, 64 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 237, 248 (2003).
137 See Lee et al., supra note 58, at 163 (noting that "controlling one's cerebral activity
to avoid detection is unfeasible").
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of that face. 138 This is true even in cases in which the subject has
taken a conscious decision to not reveal his knowledge.1 3 9 Thus,
whereas other means of coercive interrogation have the potential to
compromise a subject's free will, fMRI in fact involves the complete
"elimination of the source's free will.' 40
Although fMRI does extract information from the detainee
against the detainee's will, does it "compel an act against one's will," as
required to meet the definition of coercion set forth in FM 34-52?141
Unlike physical coercion, fMRI does not require the detainee to af-
firmatively act, as it never requires the detainee to verbalize the infor-
mation. In this sense, fMRI does not compel an action. But while FM
34-52 includes this "compel an act" requirement, it is not found in the
Conventions. The Conventions prohibit any form of coercion "in-
flicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any
kind whatever. '142 FMRI does "secure" information from the de-
tainee, as the term "secure" does not implicate any action on the part
of the detainee. Thus, as the Conventions, rather than FM 34-52, are
the controlling legal authority, the compulsion requirement set forth
in FM 34-52 is inapplicable.
Therefore, because fMRI secures information from the detainee
against the detainee's free will, it must be regarded as "coercive"
under the Conventions.
III
FMRI UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs LAw
AND U.S. LAW
A. Applicable Law
1. Detainee Status
Under current U.S. policy, the legal rights of a detainee to whom
IHL does not apply are dependent upon the detainee's physical loca-
tion. The United States has never explicitly confirmed this policy, al-
though it can be inferred from official statements. For example, the
Bush Administration opposed legislation that would have had the ef-
fect of prohibiting members of other governmental agencies from em-
ploying CID treatment against detainees held abroad. 43 In a letter to
Congress, then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice opposed
the measure because it would "provide [ ] legal protections to foreign
138 See Flam, supra note 70.
139 See id.
140 See FM 34-52, supra note 123, at 1-8.
141 See id. at 1-8.
142 Geneva III, supra note 14, art. 17, para. 4.
143 See Douglas Jehl & David Johnson, Mhite House Fought New Curbs on Interrogation,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al.
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prisoners to which they are not now entitled under applicable law and pol-
icy."'1 4 4 Similarly, during his confirmation hearing, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, in response to written questions regarding whether
U.S. personnel engage in CID treatment abroad, stated that "the De-
partment of Justice has concluded that under Article 16 there is no
legal prohibition under the CAT on cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment with respect to aliens overseas.' 4 5 The United States ar-
gues that the same geographic limitations apply with respect to the
ICCPR.146 All members of the U.S. Armed Forces are prohibited from
engaging in CID treatment regardless of their location.' 4 7 Thus,
under current U.S. policy, only members of other governmental agen-
cies operating outside U.S. territory may engage in conduct that
would constitute CID treatment if it occurred in the United States.
The Administration's position is based on two arguments. First,
Article 16 of the CAT requires states to "undertake to prevent in any
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.' 48 The Administration argues that this
Article sets forth a territorial limitation on the extent of the United
States' obligations under the CAT to "'any territory under its jurisdic-
tion,' which would exclude any place overseas that is not under U.S.
jurisdiction."'149
144 Id. (emphasis added). Although Congress ultimately did not approve this measure,
a similar, though more limited, provision was successftilly attached to a later budget appro-
priation providing additional funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Eric Licht-
blau, Congress Adopts Restriction on Treatment of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at AI6.
This provision specified that none of the appropriated funds could be expended to subject
any person to CID treatment. Id.
145 See Letter from Patrick Leahy, Senator, et al., to John Ashcroft, Attorney General
(Jan. 25, 2005), at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CAT%20Article%
2016.Leahy-Feinstein-Feingold%20Letters.pdf (last visited June 15, 2005).
146 See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2(1) ("Each State Party ... undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to itsjurisdiction the rights rec-
ognized in the present Covenant."); Luigi Condorelli & Pasquale De Sena, The Relevance of
the Obligations flowing from the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to US Courts Dealing
with Guantdnamo Detainees, 2J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 107, 108 (2004) ("[T]he Covenant itself
defines, in Article 2(1), the territorial scope (ratione loci) of the obligations imposed on
States Parties."). The now-declassified April 2003 Department of Defense Working Group
Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism argues that the United
States "has maintained consistently that the Covenant does not apply outside the United
States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction." See DOD WORKINc GROUP RE-
PORT, supra note 40, at 290.
147 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 93, 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000) (prohibiting
U.S. armed forces from engaging in cruelty toward or oppression or maltreatment of pris-
oners); id. art. 128 (prohibiting assault); id. art. 134 (prohibiting threats, i.e., conduct
bringing "discredit upon the armed forces").
148 See CAT, supra note 17, art. 16.
149 See Letter from Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella, Dep't ofJustice, to
Patrick L. Leahy, U.S. Senator (Apr. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Moschella Letter], http://www.
scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CAT%2Article%2016.Leahy-Feinstein-Feingold%
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Second, the Administration argues that the U.S. reservations, un-
derstandings and declarations (RUDs) to the CAT,151 which are dis-
cussed in depth infra, only prohibit CID treatment to the extent that
such treatment is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment1 5' to the U.S.
Constitution. 152  Because, the Administration argues, 153 the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to aliens in U.S. custody overseas,1 5 4 this
geographic restriction was incorporated into the CAT and ICCPR by
the U.S. RUDs. Thus, even if the interpretation of the geographic
restriction of Article 16 is erroneous, U.S. personnel would still not be
prohibited from engaging in CID treatment abroad.
There is serious debate regarding the validity of these arguments.
In particular, the Supreme Court's decision in the combined cases of
Rasul v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States,155 holding that detainees at
Guantanamo Bay may challenge their detentions via writs of habeas
corpus, casts doubt on the validity of current U.S. policy. 156 This de-
bate, however, lies beyond the scope of this Note. Because U.S. policy
still distinguishes detainees held abroad from those held in the
United States, this Note analyzes the potential use of fMRI in interro-
gation under the assumption that neither the Fifth Amendment nor
IHRL anti-CID treatment provisions apply abroad. If Fifth Amend-
ment and CID treatment protections are eventually extended to de-
tainees in U.S. custody abroad as a matter of policy or as the result of
legal challenges, the analysis of the legality of fMRI in those interroga-
tions would become the same as the analysis for detainees held in U.S.
territory set forth infra.
Regardless of the extent of the extraterritorial application of the
U.S. Constitution, federal statutes prohibit all U.S. personnel from us-
20Letters.pdf (last visited June 5, 2005). U.S. territory is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000 &
Supp. II 2002).
150 136 CONG. REc. 36198-99 (1990) (containing the U.S. Senate resolution to advise
and consent to ratification of the CAT, subject to certain reservations, understandings, and
declarations); see Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From
Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARv. HuM. Ris. J. 87, 98
(2001).
151 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152 See Moschella Letter, supra note 149, at 2-3.
153 See id.
154 SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771-73 (1950) (noting that "in extending
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out
that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary
power to act" and that nonresident enemy aliens do not have access to U.S. courts); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
155 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) ("We therefore hold that [the relevant statute] confers
on the District Courtjurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legal-
ity of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.").
156 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases,
2004 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 49, 49 (noting that the recent holding "appears to be a striking
break from the 1950 Johnson v. Eisentrager decision").
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ing torture outside U.S. territory. The Federal Torture Statute
criminalizes acts of torture committed by a U.S. national outside U.S.
territory. 1 5 7 The statute's definition of torture tracks the language
found in the CAT. 158 It does not, however, include any provision re-
garding CID treatment.159 Notably, the Torture Memos only analyzed
the interrogation of foreign detainees held abroad under the Federal
Torture Statute, further suggesting that the United States has deter-
mined that only the statute, and not the U.S. Constitution, protects
these detainees. 60
Thus, under current U.S. Folicy, detainees held within the
United States are protected by both IHRL and the U.S. Constitution,
but detainees held outside the United States are entitled to protection
only under the Federal Torture Statute.
2. Protections under the CAT and U.S. Law
In 1978, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights began drafting
the CAT, 16 1 which the U.N. General Assembly adopted in 1984.162
The CAT establishes two categories of prohibited behavior. First, the
CAT prohibits governments from engaging in acts of torture.1 6" The
CAT defines torture as any act, done by a person acting in an official
capacity, by which "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as ob-
taining... information" from him.164 Article 2 of the CAT states that
157 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
158 Compare CAT, supra note 17, art. 1 (1) (addressing "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by... a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity"), with 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1)
(defining torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifi-
cally intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering").
159 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B.
160 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gon-
zales, Counsel to the President, supra note 40, at 172, 202-04 (discussing only "constitu-
tional problems" related to the Federal Torture Statute).
161 See G.A. Res. 62, U.N. CAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 137, U.N. Doc. A/32/355
(1977) (ordering the Commission on Human Rights to draw up a draft convention against
torture and CID treatment and punishment).
162 See CAT, supra note 17. For a detailed history of the CAT's drafting, seeJ. HERMAN
BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HAND-
BOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 31-113 (1988).
163 CAT, supra note 17, art. 2.
164 Id. art. 1 (1). The full definition of torture reads,
[A] ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent of [sic] acquiescence of a public offi-
cial or other person acting in an official capacity.
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"In]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or
a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."' 65
Second, the CAT prohibits "other acts of cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment" and "ill-treatment."'1 66 These
terms, however, are not defined.16 7 Nevertheless, the U.N.'s Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials states that the phrase "should
be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against
abuses, whether physical or mental."168 Under Article 16, State Parties
are required to "undertake to prevent" these acts. t"'
The United States ratified the CAT in 1994.170 Before ratifica-
tion, however, the United States made a number of RUDs to the
CAT.171 The United States is only bound to adhere to the provisions
of the CAT to the extent of its RUDs. t72 The U.S, reservations con-
tained two important limitations relating to the definition of torture
under the CAT.173 First, the United States attached a "specific intent"
requirement to the definition of torture. 74 In other words, the tor-
turer must intend to inflict severe pain upon the subject. Second, the
United States clarified the "mental pain or suffering" requirement of
the torture definition, declaring that mental pain or suffering re-
quired "prolonged mental harm."' 75  Moreover, this prolonged
mental harm must have resulted from one of the following:
(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe phys-
ical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or
Id.
165 Id. art. 2(2).
166 Id. arts. 13, 16(1).
167 SeeJeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber Does the United States Engage in the Use of
Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 Ky. L.J. 849, 860 (2004).
168 G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, art. 5, cmt. c, at 187, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/34/169 (1979).
169 CAT, supra note 17, art 16(1); seeAddicott, supra note 167.
170 See The Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratification
of the Convention against Torture (noting the United States ratified the CAT on Oct. 21,
1994), at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-ratify.hm (last modified Nov. 2, 2004).
171 136 CONG. REc. 36198-99 (1990) (containing the U.S. Senate resolution to advise
and consent to ratification of the CAT, subject to certain reservations, understandings, and
declarations); see Nagan & Atkins, supra note 150, at 98; Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 21, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention];JEFFREY L. DUNOFF FT AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRMs, AcTORS, PRO-
cESS 65-66 (2002).
172 See Vienna Convention, supra note 171, art. 21 ("A reservation ... [mlodifies for
the reserving State . .. the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates to the
extent of the reservation . . . ."); DUNOFrr T AL., supra note 171, at 65-66.
173 See 136 CONG. REC. 36198-99 (1990).
174 See id. at S17491 ("[T]he United States understands that, in order to constitute
torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering. .. ").
175 Id.
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threatened administration or application, of mind altering sub-
stances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4)
the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calcu-
lated to disrupt profoundly the senese [sic] or personality.1 76
The United States also attempted to clarify the lines between tor-
ture, CID treatment, and acceptable practice. The Senate declared
that the United States would only consider itself bound to prevent
CID treatment "only insofar as the term ... means the cruel, unusual
and inhuman treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."1 77
3. Protections under the ICCPR
The ICCPR uses the same language as the CAT to prohibit tor-
ture and CID treatment. 7 8 Article 7 states that "[no] one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."1 79 As with the CAT, the United States entered a num-
ber of RUDs to the ICCPR.'80 Specifically, the Senate clarified the
meaning of Article 7 through a reservation that defined "cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment" as "the cruel and unu-
sual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." '8 1
Thus, the analysis of this issue is identical under the CAT, the ICCPR,
and U.S. domestic law.
B. Permissibility under U.S. and International Human Rights
Law
1. Torture
Little decisional law defines the threshold of torture. What law
does exist, however, indicates that torture requires the infliction of
severe pain.8 2 There is also widespread agreement that certain ex-
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 7.
179 Id.
180 See 138 CONG. REc. 8070-71 (1992) (documenting the U.S. Senate resolution of
advice and consent to ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
181 See id. at 8070.
182 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundija, 121 I.L.R. 213, 264, 292 (ICTY App. Chamber
2000) (defining torture as
(i) ... the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental; in addition
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treme methods of physical pressure represent torture per se. For ex-
ample, international tribunals have held that beatings with wood
sticks or metal bars severe enough to cause pain and swelling-but
not broken bones-constitute torture.1 8 3 Tribunals have also found
that extended periods of standing, starvation, electric shock, being
hung from the arms, and having one's head held under water also
constitute torture.18 4
Furthermore, the concurrent application of techniques that
would not, by themselves, represent impermissible treatment may be
illegal. For example, in Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Com-
mission on Human Rights found that, taken as a whole, certain British
military interrogation techniques used in Northern Ireland against
suspected members of the Irish Republican Army amounted to tor-
ture.1 85 British forces allegedly subjected detainees to extended
standing, loud noises, sleep deprivation, and starvation and dehydra-
tion.186 The United Kingdom appealed the decision to the European
Court of Human Rights, which reversed the Commission. 187 The
court found that the practices represented inhuman and degrading
treatment but held that they did not rise to the level of torture. 188
The court also found that the difference between torture and inhu-
mane and degrading treatment was a difference in the "intensity of
the suffering inflicted."'189 The court noted that torture carries "a spe-
cial stigma" and therefore should be limited to practices that have a
"particular intensity and cruelty."19 0
Thus, pain would appear to be a necessary condition for physical
torture. FMRI is not painful. As the Massachusetts General Hospital/
Harvard Medical School's standard patient consent form for fMRI-re-
lated studies notes, "A magnetic resonance scan is not uncomforta-
(ii) this act or omission must be intentional;
(iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing,
intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at
discriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person;
(iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict
183 See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
89-90 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the European Commission of Human Rights held in
1997 that "numerous medically certified trauma on various parts of the body, consistent
with the application of beatings involving punches, kicks and blows with a truncheon and
baseball bat . .. was proof of torture").
184 See it. at 85-90 (listing various actions that international tribunals have deemed
torturous).
185 19 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R, 512, 792-94 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 1976).
186 See id. at 514.
187 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 106-08 (1978).
188 Id. at 80.
189 Id.
190 I/
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ble."19' The only conceivable pain that the fMRI could inflict would
result from restraints to keep the individual immobile while inside the
fMRI scanning device. 192 Because fMRI works by superimposing a se-
ries of still scans over one another, an individual's head movement
could compromise the quality of the scan. 93 Nevertheless, the re-
straints are not severe. At Massachusetts General Hospital, for exam-
ple, a subject's head is immobilized with foam pillows. 194
Even allowing for additional restraint of an uncooperative subject
in an interrogation, these restraints would almost certainly not inflict
anything near the level of pain that would rise to torture. Moreover,
although the individual would need to be in this position for an ex-
tended period, the subject is required only to remain lying down.
Thus, the fMRI technique is dissimilar to so-called "stress positions" 95
and certainly bears no relation to the extreme stress positions, such as
being hung by the arms, that international tribunals have deemed to
be torture.' 96
The use of an fMRI scanner would almost certainly not represent
mental torture either. Arguably, a claustrophobic detainee might ex-
perience mental suffering while in the fMRI machine. However, the
United States clarified the "mental pain or suffering" requirement of
the torture definition, declaring that mental pain or suffering re-
quired "prolonged mental harm.1 97 Moreover, this "prolonged
mental harm" must have been the result of, amongst other things, the
use of mind-altering substances or procedures. 198
Even if fMRI were a mind-altering procedure, the slight mental
discomfort resulting from a psychological condition inherent in the
detainee is probably not sufficiently severe to rise to the level of tor-
ture. Thus far, cases of mental torture tend to be limited to severe
forms of mental suffering occasioned by actions such as mock execu-
tion or threatened dismemberment or castration.1 99 Moreover, re-
gardless of a detainee's mental condition while in the fMRI scanner,
191 MGH/MIT/HMS ATHINOULA A. MARTINOS CENTER FOR BIOMEDICAL IMAGING, SAM-
PLE CONSENT FORM [hereinafter MARTINOS CENTER], available at http://www.nir.mgh.har
vard.edu/sample.consent_form.htm (last visited May 26, 2005).
192 See id. Individuals who have electrical, magnetic, or mechanical implants may be
subject to additional risks. See id.; supra Part I.B.
193 See MARTINOS CENTER, supra note 191.
194 Id.
195 See Bravin & Fields, supra note 91; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse
but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al (discussing "stress and duress"
techniques).
196 See RODLEY, supra note 183, at 85-90.
197 136 CONG. REc. 36198 (1990).
198 Id.
199 WAR CRIMES DOCUMENTATION CENT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, REPORT ON IRAQI
WAR CRIMES (DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM) 8 (1992) (unclassified version), reprinted in
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 16-18, U.N. Doc. S/25441 (1993).
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the detainee would almost certainly not suffer prolonged mental
harm because of it. Therefore, the use of an tMRI scanner in interro-
gation would probably not constitute torture under IHRL and U.S.
law.
2. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading and "Conscience-Shocking"
Treatment
The permissibility of fMRI under the CID treatment provisions of
international law, as well as under U.S. domestic law, is much less clear.
Under the conventional international interpretation of CID treat-
ment, the use of an fMRI scanner during interrogation would likely
not violate the prohibition on CID treatment. The few international
tribunals that have examined the definition of CID treatment have, as
with torture, focused on the infliction of pain as the key element. For
example, the European Court of Human Rights emphasized that the
level of "suffering inflicted" was the key distinction between CID treat-
ment and torture, indicating the need for some level of suffering for a
technique to rise to the level of CID treatment. 200 Because the fMRI is
painless, these provisions would not prohibit it.
a. Effect of U.S. RUDs
Nevertheless, the U.S. reservations to the CAT and ICCPR may-
unusually-establish greater protections against interrogation with
fMRI technology than the treaties themselves would provide. The
U.S. RUDs to the CAT and ICCPR define CID treatment as "the cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.1201 The full meaning of this reservation is not im-
mediately obvious.
Clearly, the reservation incorporates U.S. Eighth Amendment
constitutional jurisprudence into the definition of CID treatment.
Thus, any behavior that violates the "cruel and unusual punishment"
provision of the Eighth Amendment, but does not rise to the level of
torture, is CID treatment under U.S. law. The Eighth Amendment
provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 20 2
Most, if not all, of the punishments the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits would rise to the level of torture under existing international
legal definitions of that term and, therefore, would not need to be
analyzed as CID treatment. For example, in Wilkerson v. Utah, the Su-
preme Court noted that the Eighth Amendment prohibited behavior
200 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 80 (1978).
201 136 CONG. REc. 36198 (1990).
202 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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such as beheading, quartering, or disembowelling a prisoner; burning
a prisoner alive; or dragging a prisoner to the place of execution.
20 3
Few modern interrogation techniques fall into this category of behav-
ior, however, and fMRI certainly would not.
The Court later expanded Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
noting that in addition to providing minimum standards for treat-
ment from which the government could not deviate, the Eighth
Amendment also drew "its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."20 4 As such, the
Court will look to standards in the United States and, in some cases,
the world,2°3 to determine if societal opinion has coalesced against a
particular practice, rendering it an Eighth Amendment violation. 20 6
The vast majority of the Court's opinions relating to "evolving
standards of decency," however, involve the death penalty or prison
conditions. The death penalty cases provide no guidance for deter-
mining whether a practice short of the infliction of capital punish-
ment would constitute CID treatment. Similarly, the prison-
conditions cases do not shed much light on the use of fMRI. These
cases prohibit practices such as the "unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain"20 7 or "deliberate indifference" toward a prisoner's physi-
cal needs.20 Considering the very high standard these cases establish,
the painless use of fMRI would not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. "Evolving standards of decency" may prohibit
the use of a device as mentally invasive as fMRI, but it is not clear what
evidence would presently support this assertion because there has
been insufficient time for public opinion to form on this issue.
The role of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the United
States' RUDs to the CAT and the ICCPR is unsettled. The RUDs state
that CID treatment is any "cruel and unusual treatment or punish-
ment" that the Amendments prohibit.20 9 Nevertheless, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments do not, per se, prohibit "cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment."2 10 It seems reasonable to read this provi-
sion to mean that the United States defines CID treatment as cotermi-
nous with actions that would violate the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments.
203 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
204 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
205 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) ("It is proper that we
acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death
penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional im-
balance of young people may often be a factor in the crime.").
206 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
207 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
208 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
209 136 CONG. REc. 36198 (1990).
210 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
2005] 1627
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Not all provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are,
however, applicable in the context of interrogation of foreign detain-
ees. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is almost
certainly not applicable. In Chavez v. Martinez, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the clause was a "trial right."21 ' As such, unless and
until the government introduces statements elicited in violation of
Fifth Amendment protections at the defendant's trial, there is no Fifth
Amendment violation. 212 Thus, unless the U.S. government seeks to
bring a detainee to trial, which appears unlikely under current U.S.
policy, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment will not
affect the interrogation. The Court left open the question of whether
other Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights were also "trial
rights."2 13
It may be possible to extend the logic of the Court's holding to
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. If
so, none of the protections would apply unless the government sought
to introduce the detainee's statement at trial. A close reading of the
Court's opinion in Chavez, however, suggests that the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect detainees
regardless of whether they are brought to trial. In Chavez, the Court
approved 214 its holding in Rochin v. California, in which it noted that
official conduct, including custodial conduct, that "shocks the con-
science" violates the Due Process Clause when the conduct itself oc-
curs.2 1 5 Although the Chavez Court rejected the defendant's due
process claim, the Court considered whether the state actor's behavior
shocked the conscience without considering whether the evidence was
used at trial.216 This suggests that the Court would countenance a
substantive due process violation even if the statement extracted was
not used at the detainee's subsequent trial.
b. The "Shocks the Conscience" Test
The effect of the RUDs and Court's holding in Chavez is to bring
the archaic "shocks the conscience" standard to the forefront of this
analysis.2 17 It is less than clear what interrogation techniques "shock
211 538 U.S. 760, 771 (2003).
212 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) ("[T]he privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right
of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may
ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial." (citations
omitted)).
213 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
214 See id. at 774.
215 See 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
216 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774-75.
217 See id. at 773 (noting that "police torture or other abuse" resulting in a confession is
unconstitutional even when the statements are not used at trial; in s.-ch cases the Four-
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the conscience." At a minimum, due process "prohibits improper...
use of physical force, threats of force, and extreme forms of psycho-
logical pressure during interrogation .... ,,21* It is crucial to under-
stand, moreover, that "the standard for finding a confession to be
involuntary is much lower than the 'shock the conscience' substantive
due process standard."2 19 The shocks-the-conscience standard pro-
vides protection against "only the most egregious official conduct. 220
Thus, the "touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against.., the exercise of power without any reasonable justification
in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. '221
The Supreme Court's holdings in this area are not overly helpful
in clarifying the issue. At times the Court speaks of a "sense of jus-
tice"222 or notions of "fair play and decency"2 2 3 as embodying, or at
least informing, the due-process standard, while at other times it uses
the disjunctive to compare these concepts and the standard.22 4 Simi-
larly, a plain reading of the test suggests that the judge's conscience is
the one that must be shocked,2 2 5 although the Court has also sug-
gested that the "whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that
has been woven by common experience into the fabric of acceptable
conduct" provides the appropriate "yardstick."226 Moreover, the
Court has taken pains to emphasize that the standard is not merely
subjective.
If the Court's shocks-the-conscience jurisprudence is to be some-
thing more than the subjective, visceral reaction of the putative
shockee to the methods used, the shocks-the-conscience test must nec-
essarily be reduced to two component elements: the nature of the
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause governs instead of the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause).
218 See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 477
(2002).
219 Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the
Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 417, 471 (1994).
220 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
221 id, at 845-46 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
222 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Due process of law, as a historic
and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of
conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods
that offend 'a sense of justice.'").
223 Id. ("Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.
So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the
court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law.").
224 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 437 (1957) (holding that "a blood test taken
by a skilled technician is not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience,' norsuch a method
of obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of justice'" (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
225 Indeed, in Rochin, Justice Frankfurter specifically noted the uniform shock of the
judges below. See 342 U.S. at 166-67.
226 See Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436.
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bodily invasion and the degree of coercion exercised in effecting that
invasion.227 Consider, for example, the Court's holding in Rochin v.
California.228 In Rochin, the Court held that involuntarily pumping the
stomach of a suspect to extract capsules that contained illegal narcot-
ics shocked the conscience. 229 In its reasoning, the Court was con-
cerned with the invasiveness of the use of a stomach-pump to gather
evidence, but it was equally, if not more, concerned with the tactics
the police used to effect the stomach-pumping.2 30
The dual considerations of inherent invasiveness and coercion
used to effect the invasion were also salient, though not explicit, in
the Court's ruling in Breithaupt v. Abram. 2'1 In Breithaupt, the Court
held that drawing blood from an unconscious suspect to determine
his level of intoxication did not shock the conscience.2 3 2 The Court
distinguished the behavior at issue in Breithaupt from the involuntary
stomach pumping at issue in Rochin on the grounds that "there is
nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when
done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a physician. ' 233 The
Court placed great weight on the fact that these types of blood tests
were routine procedures, carried out in accord with medical stan-
dards.234 While acknowledging the individual's right "that his person
be held inviolable,"' 2 35 the Court noted that "millions of Americans"
submit to blood tests "as a matter of course nearly every day"23 6 and
concluded that "the absence of conscious consent, without more, does
not necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional
right. '2 37 Thus, the Court's opinion could be read to suggest blood
testing is less inherently brutal or offensive than stomach pumping,
primarily owing to the commonality with which Americans' blood is
drawn. But this cannot be correct.
As Chief Justice Warren noted in dissent, this blood sampling
might have appeared benign, especially when compared to the facts in
Rochin, because the defendant was not in a position to object or re-
sist.23 8 No physical coercion accompanied the blood test-unlike the
227 See id. at 441 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
228 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
229 Id. at 172.
230 See id. ("Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this
course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities.").
231 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
232 Id, at 436-37.
233 Id. at 435.
234 See id.
235 Id. at 439.
236 Id. This estimate may overstate the amount of blood testing in the United States.
237 Id. at 435.
238 See id. at 441 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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violent methods used to suppress the stomach pumpee in Rochin-
because the defendant in Breithaupt was unconscious. 239 Assume, how-
ever, that the defendant in Breithaupt was conscious and engaged in a
struggle with the police to avoid the blood test. Specifically, assume
the police behaved exactly as they did in Rochin, except that instead of
"forcibl[y] extract[ing] his stomach's contents," 240 they forcibly ex-
tracted the contents of his veins. On these facts, the Court's ruling in
Breithaupt might have been different. At least it would have been a
closer question, as the Breithaupt Court gave significant weight to the
benign, clinical setting of the blood test,24 1 particularly as compared
to the violence that permeated the government action in Rochin.
Thus, although a court may conduct a shocks-the-conscience
analysis as a totality-of-the-circumstances test, as noted above two fac-
tors are actually at issue: first, the level of coercion the government
would use to effect the bodily invasion, and second, the inherent level
of shock from the invasiveness of the technique itself.2 4 2 It is the cu-
mulative effect of these two factors that determines whether actions
shock the conscience. Moreover, as the Court noted in County of Sac-
ramento v. Lewis, government action "in the service of a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective" could provide a "reasonable justification" for the
conduct,2 43 which would, therefore, not shock the conscience. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to make an a priori assessment of whether fMRI
shocks the conscience because the level of coercion used to effect the
scan and the government interest which the scan will service is
unknowable.
With respect to the level of coercion used to effect the scan, two
points are notable. First, unlike blood tests, the fMRI scanner cannot
operate on an unconscious individual, so some form of restraint will
be required. Second, fMRI requires the subject to be very still during
the procedure. Thus, the government will have to use considerable
restraint to ensure that an unwilling subject remains virtually
motionless. 244
The issue of fMRI's inherent invasiveness is more suitable to a
priori analysis. As in the IHL context, fMRI could arguably be likened
to the polygraph. Existing precedent does not regard the use of a lie
detector in an investigatory-rather than trial-setting as a violation
239 See id. at 435.
240 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
241 See Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435 (noting that the testing was conducted "under the
protective eye of a physician").
242 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
243 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998).
244 The government would be advised, however, to use the minimum feasible amount
of force to secure the individual in the scanner.
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of the defendant's rights. 24 5 There is certainly no holding suggesting
that the application of a polygraph in this setting would shock the
conscience. In light of this, consider the following hypothetical.246
Assume that the polygraph could be improved such that it could
achieve substantially the same result as an fMRJ scan. The polygraph
would still rely on testing physiological responses such as heart rate,
blood pressure, and galvanic response, but technological improve-
ments would provide the examiner with an essentially infallible ability
to detect lying and even to discern certain reactions, such as facial
recognition. Would the increased effectiveness of such a hypothetical
"advanced polygraph" render its use unconstitutional in an investiga-
tory setting? The answer would appear to be no. While this may sug-
gest that fMRI should also be permissible, the issue is somewhat more
complicated.
Although the polygraph and fMRI appear comparable, they are
fundamentally different technologies. Indeed, it is these differences
that highlight the true implications of fMRI technology in interroga-
tion. U.S. law regarding polygraphs does not resolve the fMRI issue
because of the consent-based nature of polygraphs and because of the
general inadmissibility of polygraph evidence. No court has ever held
that that the involuntary application of a polygraph violates a de-
tainee's rights because involuntary application is impossible. The pol-
ygraph is a consent-based interrogation method. The individual has
to choose to answer for the polygraph to generate a reading of the
individual's physiological manifestations of the stress of lying. Thus,
there is no precedent addressing an "involuntary polygraph," as the
concept is incoherent.
The same is not true of the fMRI, which could extract informa-
tion such as facial recognition and emotional response involuntarily
from the detainee. Moreover, even if administering an involuntary
polygraph were somehow possible, the courts simply have not had an
opportunity to consider the possibility because of the general inadmis-
sibility of polygraph evidence without stipulation. Consequently, the
polygraph precedents are inapposite to the extent the detainee does
not consent to procedure.
245 See, e.g., Leeks v, State, 245 P.2d 764, 771 (1952). Courts traditionally have ex-
cluded polygraph evidence from trial based on concerns of reliability, lack of standardiza-
tion, and undue impact on the jury. See U.S. v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180, 182-83 (4th Cir.
1984); deVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 945 (1st Cir. 1983); Leeks,
245 P.2d at 771. For our purposes, however, such trial-related concerns are irrelevant, as
the government would likely be more interested in extracting information from the de-
tainee, rather than obtaining information to use against the detainee at trial.
246 Thanks to Michael Schrage for suggesting this hypothetical, which very much clari-
fied my thinking in this area.
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Thus, to the extent that a detainee consents to an fMRI scan,
however, its use probably would not be distinguishable from that of a
polygraph. In a consent context, therefore, the use of fMRI in inter-
rogation would probably not represent a violation of due process and
almost certainly would not shock the conscience. The more interest-
ing and important question is whether the involuntary application of
fMRI in interrogation, such as in cases where it is used to extract invol-
untarily cognitive information from the detainee, violates due process.
The use of fMRI to extract involuntary information from a de-
tainee's mind should be regarded as infringing upon a "fundamental
liberty interest."247 To rise to the level of a "fundamental liberty inter-
est," the right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
'
"
248
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to ex-
pand the protections of substantive due process, 249 and the Court has
never explicitly found a right "to be free from unwanted extractions
from the mind" to exist. The lack of a clear holding on this point is
unsurprising, considering that no technology has existed that would
allow the government to reach into an individual's mind.
Nevertheless, such a fundamental liberty interest must exist, in
light of "this Nation's history and tradition." AsJustice Cardozo noted
in Palko v. Connecticut, "[F] reedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With
rare aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in
our history, political and legal."250 The guarantee of freedom of
thought, furthermore, "includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."'25 1
Furthermore, the right to be free from unwanted extractions
from the mind is a necessary and fundamental component of the
right to privacy. Although "the Constitution does not explicitly men-
tion any right of privacy," the Court has repeatedly recognized that
the Due Process Clause's guarantee of liberty protects "a right of per-
sonal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy." 2 5 2
Thus far, the focus of the Court's right to privacy has been on free-
dom in personal decisionmaking, such as with abortion, 253 mar-
247 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 775, 760 (2003) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
251 SeeW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943).
252 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
253 Id.
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riage,2 54 procreation, 2 55 family relations, 256 child rearing and
education, 25 7 and contraception. 2 51 But such concern with privacy in
decisionmaking necessarily implies concern with privacy and security
in one's own mind. If the right to privacy is to mean anything, it must
mean security from unwanted government intrusion into the mind.
As the Court has held, "The makers of our Constitution... sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations." 25 9 Consequently, the use of fMRI to extract cogni-
tive information from a nonconsenting detainee must be regarded as
compromising a fundamental liberty interest.
While it is true that the detainee's body is not physically compro-
mised by fMRI, this point cannot be determinative for two reasons.
First, the fact that fMRI technology is passive, in the sense that it does
not enter the body (aside from magnetic waves passing through the
body), is irrelevant to these considerations because the concern is
with the mental, rather than physical, intrusion. Second, assuming
there is a fundamental liberty interest in private thought, the mere-
and inevitable-advance of technology cannot be allowed to erode
this right. As the Court noted in Kyllo v. United States, in the Fourth
Amendment context technological advance cannot be allowed to
erode the "degree of privacy against government that existed when"
the Constitution was adopted. 260 Notably, in Kyllo the Court rejected
as "a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" the argu-
ment that the thermal imaging technology, which allows police to
measure heat emanating from particular areas of a structure, was con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment because it passively measured
heat emanating "off-the-wall" of the building, rather than actively
looking "through-the-wall." 261 Thus, regardless of the technological
particulars of the fMRI, it still must be regarded as intruding upon the
fundamental liberty interest in private thought.
Finally, consideration must also be given to the government's
purpose in subjecting the detainee to the fMRI scan. The Court
noted in Lewis that the conduct "most likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level" is the "conduct intended to injure in some way unjusti-
fiable by any government interest."262 Thus, even a substantial liberty
254 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
255 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
256 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
257 Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
258 Griswold v. Connecuticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
259 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
260 See 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
261 See id. at 35.
262 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
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interest militating against this type of invasive procedure may not pre-
vent the use of fMRI in scenarios in which the government's conduct
could be justified. Although the government's interest in interrogat-
ing a high-value terrorist may be justifiable, its interest in interrogat-
ing every foreign detainee probably will not rise to a requisite level of
importance.
In Chavez, however, Justice Thomas appears to apply the "any gov-
ernment interest" standard very broadly.263 Ironically, the govern-
ment interest Justice Thomas relied on to justify the police's
treatment of Martinez was "the need to investigate whether there had
been police misconduct," the police misconduct being the police
shooting of Martinez. 264 Thomas' comments suggest that nothing
short of random violence by the government against individuals could
ever shock the conscience, and fMRIs against suspected terrorists
would certainly not be captured under this standard. Nevertheless,
Thomas' application of the "any government interest" element is
overly broad and, if followed, would render the shocks-the-conscience
standard irrelevant.
Thomas' reading of the "any government interest" standard is
wrong for two reasons. First, it misinterprets the Court's statement of
the standard in Lewis, where the Court found that conduct "most
likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level" is the "conduct in-
tended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government inter-
est."26 5 The Court's statement does not mean that "any government
interest" will justify any government conduct, but rather that the
chances of such conduct shocking the conscience would increase if
there were no government interest present. Thus, while the presence
of a government interest may increase what level of egregious govern-
ment conduct is required to shock the conscience, it does not fore-
close the possibility that conduct, even in the service of a government
interest, could shock the conscience. Second, Thomas' interpretation
ignores the fact that the Court has held conduct in the service of gov-
ernment interest to shock the conscience. In Rochin, for example, the
police pumped the suspect's stomach to obtain evidence in a criminal
investigation, yet the involuntary stomach pumping still shocked the
conscience.266
Consequently, the government will likely have to allege some rea-
sonable justification to subject a detainee to involuntary fMRI.
263 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) ("Here, there is no evidence that
Chavez acted with a purpose to harm Martinez by intentionally interfering with his medical
treatment.").
264 See id.
265 523 U.S. at 849.
266 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
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Clearly, in the case of a detainee believed to have information regard-
ing an imminent terrorist attack, the government would have a suffi-
cient interest to subject the detainee to fMRI, assuming that
reasonable levels of force were used to secure the detainee in the scan-
ner. 26 7 Beyond this it is difficult to establish a per se rule, as the ele-
ments of coercive force used to effect the scan and the government
interest involved will, of course, vary with each detainee. Given the
extreme expense and operational requirements of contemporary
fMRI scanners, 268 however, it is, as a practical matter, unlikely that the
government will be subjecting large numbers of detainees to fMRI in
the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
The issue of torture raises a fundamental question about the
American character: Can we be inhumane in the defense of our hu-
manity? FMRI represents a quintessentially American solution to this
problem-namely, the application of technology to avoid the issue.
As a policy matter, fMRI is appealing. An fMRI scan simply
"looks" better than physical abuse. As such, revelations regarding the
use of fMRI in interrogation will not likely cause the same type of
global condemnation and outrage that compromised American moral
legitimacy and prestige after Abu Ghraib. Indeed, unlike most other
aggressive interrogation techniques, the use of fMRI is not likely to
result in Abu Ghraib-type abuses or to even expand much beyond
high-value terrorist detainees.2 69 Although the introduction of aggres-
sive interrogation techniques into a detention facility always occasions
the risk that interrogators will apply these techniques to detainees not
deemed to be high-value, there is a much smaller chance of such mi-
gration with fMRI technology. Moreover, fMRI would obviate con-
cerns regarding the reliability of information obtained by torture.270
Despite its appeal, fMRI's use remains legally questionable. The
involuntary use of fMRI scanning in interrogation most likely violates
IHL and, therefore, cannot be used against detainees captured during
an armed conflict who are entitled to POW or civilian status. In cases
where the United States uses excessive force in securing the detainee
in the fMRI scanner or where there is no reasonable government in-
267 See, e.g., Bowden, supra note 3, at 53 (arguing that if there is any situation in which
the use of torture in interrogation may be justified it is in the interrogation of terrorists
plotting major attacks).
268 See O'Brien, supra note 44.
269 See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU
GHRAiB 60-63 (2004) (arguing that techniques originally designed for use solely against
high-value targets migrated to increasingly lower-level detainees).
270 See O'Brien, supra note 44 ("[V]ictims will often say anything (to the point of falsely
incriminating themselves) to put an end to pain.").
1636 [Vol. 90:1601
2005] PSYCHIATRIC NEUROIMAGING 1637
terest at stake in the scan, the use of fMRI against detainees protected
by IHRL and the U.S. Constitution would probably shock the con-
science. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the United States from
deploying fMRI against high-value targets or detainees with knowl-
edge about an imminent terrorist attack, as the government interest
there implicated would be sufficient to justify all but the most egre-
gious government conduct.
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